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Summary
Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory suggests that greater openness enlarges inter-country
differences in stocks of skill (or human capital), which new growth theory suggests would
cause inter-country divergence of per capita incomes.  Econometric analysis of data on about
90 countries during 1960-90 confirms that greater openness tends to cause divergence of
secondary and tertiary enrolment rates between more-educated and less-educated countries,
and also between land-scarce and land-abundant countries.  These findings may have
implications for the optimal choice of trade policies by poor countries.
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2Are differences in per capita income between countries reduced or increased by trade, and
what are the mechanisms involved?  These old questions have surfaced again recently in two
related contexts: the debate over new growth theory, and the debate over development policy
- and particularly over the right choice of trade policies by poor countries.  In both contexts,
there are sharp divisions of opinion.
The current conventional wisdom is that trade tends to cause convergence.  This view is
advanced in its strongest form by Sachs and Warner (1995) and the World Bank (e.g. 1996),
who argue that openness to trade is a necessary condition for poor countries to catch up, and
that the widening income gap between rich countries and most poor countries over the past
few decades (Pritchett, 1995; Salah-i-Martin, 1996) is due largely to the restrictions which the
latter have imposed on trade and other economic contacts with the rest of the world.  A more
focused version of this view is advanced by Ben-David (e.g. 1994, 1996, and with Loewy,
1996, and Rahman, 1996), who argues that reduction of trade barriers within specific groups
of countries, such as the European Union, has caused their incomes to converge.  The usually-
suggested underlying mechanism is that trade speeds the transfer of modern technology to
backward countries.
However, there is also a long tradition of argument in economics that trade between unequal
partners causes divergence, starting with Tucker’s critique of Hume in the 18th century
(Elmslie, 1995), and continued by List (1841), Singer (1950) and Kaldor (1981).  The
usually-suggested mechanism - formalised by Dutt (1986), Matsuyama (1992), Findlay
(1995) and Redding (1996) - is that trade shifts the structure of production towards (for the
richer partner) or away from (for the poorer partner) sectors of greater growth potential - with
faster technical progress or more opportunities for learning by doing.  The most frequently
quoted example of such a sector is manufacturing, to which agriculture is unfavourably
compared.  The policy implication is that poor countries should protect or promote sectors
with more growth potential, an approach which many observers believe to have contributed to
East Asia’s exceptional success in catching up.
We shall suggest a rather different sort of divergence hypothesis, grounded in the skill-based
version of Heckscher-Ohlin theory which has been widely used to analyse the effects of
developed-developing country trade on wage inequality (e.g. Wood, 1994).  The mechanism
is that trade-induced changes in the relative wages of skilled workers - upwards in developed
countries, downwards in developing countries - stimulate supply responses which widen the
initial gap in skill endowments between the two sorts of countries, making it harder for
developing countries to catch up in terms of income, because the availability of skilled labour
(or human capital) is a crucial determinant of economic growth.  This mechanism thus
3combines an idea from old trade theory with an idea from new growth theory.  Unlike the
models of divergence cited in the previous paragraph, which assume that some sectors have
greater growth potential, it emphasises that some factors have greater growth potential -
which has rather different implications for policy.
In this paper, we shall examine only the first part of this mechanism: the divergent response
of skill supplies to greater openness to trade.  Section 1 sets out the theory more fully, and the
following three sections test it.  Section 2 discusses the available data, with some preliminary
descriptive statistics.  Section 3 explains our econometric specification, and section 4 presents
our regression results.  Section 5 concludes.
1. Theory
This section starts with a brief review of the demand-side effects of trade on relative wages,
moves on to examine supply-side responses, and concludes by discussing the impact of skill
supply changes on income convergence.
Effects of trade on relative wages
Consider initially a simple Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model with two countries (developed and
developing), two factors (skilled and unskilled labour), and two goods (skill-intensive
machinery and labour-intensive clothing).  The developed country has a relatively large
supply of skilled labour, giving it a comparative advantage in machinery, while the
developing country’s relative abundance of unskilled labour gives it a comparative advantage
in clothing.  Increased openness to trade in the developed country thus raises its output of
machinery and reduces its output of clothing, boosting the demand for skilled labour relative
to unskilled labour, and at the same time raising the price of machinery relative to clothing,
and the wage of skilled workers relative to unskilled workers.  In the developing country, the
consequences of greater openness are exactly the opposite.
The effects on relative wages can be illustrated in a diagram adapted from Leamer (1995) and
discussed further in Wood (1995, 1996).  The vertical axis of Figure 1 measures the skilled
wage, relative to the unskilled wage, and the horizontal axis measures the number of skilled
workers, relative to the number of unskilled workers.  In the absence of trade, the demand
curve for skilled labour would be the downward-sloping line, dd, and wages would be
determined by its intersection with a supply curve (assumed for the time being to be
completely inelastic), whose position depends on the country’s endowments of skilled and
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5unskilled labour.  With supply S1, say, as in a developing country, the relative wage of skilled
labour would be w1.
The open-economy demand curve is the line DD, with three distinct segments: the flat
segment in the middle covers the range of skill supplies in which a trading economy would be
"diversified", in the sense of producing both clothing and machinery; the downward-sloping
segments at each end cover the ranges in which an economy would be a "specialised"
producer of only one of the goods (machinery at the right, clothing at the left).  More
importantly in the present context, DD cuts dd from below, at point B on the horizontal axis.
Thus in a developing country, to the left of B, opening to trade reduces the relative demand
for skilled labour, and its relative wage (from w1 to w1∗ ), while in a developed country, to the
right of B, opening raises the relative demand for, and wage of, skilled labour (from w2 to
w2
∗ ).1
The model and diagram extend easily to a more realistic world of many goods (differentiated
by skill intensity), and many countries (differentiated by skill supplies).  Figure 2 depicts the
case of six goods, in which the open-economy demand curve, DD, has five flat segments (on
each of which countries produce two goods, adjacent in skill intensity), alternating with
downward-sloping segments (on which only one good is produced).  And with a large number
of goods, DD can conveniently be approximated by a continuous line (shown with dashes in
Figure 2).  The size of the effect of opening on relative wages is then a steadily increasing
function of the distance of a country’s relative skill supply from the world average (point B),
with the sign of the effect depending on which side of the average the country lies.  Skilled
workers gain most from trade where they are most abundant, and lose most from trade where
they are most scarce.
This two-factor (skilled and unskilled labour) version of the model is a reasonable
approximation for manufactures and services, but to extend it to cover primary products,
which still dominate the exports of many developing countries, requires the introduction of a
third factor, land (or natural resources).  Primary production is usually both more land-
intensive and less skill-intensive than manufacturing (Wood and Berge, 1994; Owens and
Wood, 1995).  Opening to trade in a country with a relatively large supply of land thus shifts
the structure of output away from manufacturing towards primary production (in which the
country has a comparative advantage, given its greater land intensity), but also reduces the
demand for, and wages of, skilled workers, relative to unskilled workers, because the
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. Relative wages in the two countries thus converge, in the general spirit of the H-O factor price equalisation
theorem, and would be equalised if the trading equilibria of both countries were diversified.
6expanding primary sector uses a lower ratio of skilled to unskilled labour than the contracting
manufacturing sector.
The easiest way to accommodate primary trade in the diagram is to draw two open-economy
demand curves (Figure 3), one for land-abundant countries (DDp), the other for land-scarce
countries (DDm).  This conveys that trade tends to raise the relative wage of skilled workers
most in countries with the combination of abundant skilled labour and scarce land, and to
lower it most in countries which have both little skilled labour and a lot of land.
Supply responses
We now abandon the simplifying assumption that skill supply curves are completely inelastic,
and allow, more realistically, the relative supply of skilled workers in each country to depend
positively on the relative wage (Figure 4).  Other things being equal, that is, it seems hard to
doubt that an increase in the wage differential between skilled and unskilled workers would
induce more people to participate in education and training, and give the government and
firms more of an incentive to provide it.  However, the supply curve is not horizontal, as in
many human capital models, but has an upward slope, because people vary in their
trainability and in their access to finance for investment in skill acquisition (Wood, 1994: 53-
4).
If supply is elastic in this way, greater openness to trade tends to widen initial differences in
skill supplies among countries.  Thus, in Figure 4, the developed country’s relatively large
supply of skilled labour, n2 , is increased by trade to n2
∗
, while the developing country’s
relatively small supply of skilled labour, n1, is reduced by trade to n1
∗
.
2
  (Figure 4 omits land
for clarity, but a glance up at Figure 3 reveals that the widening of the gap in skill supplies
would be particularly marked between high-skill countries with little land and low-skill
countries with much land.)
This proposition is not new, but neither is it widely appreciated.  Ohlin himself (1933, 1967:
81-2) noted that trade tends to amplify differences in factor endowments among countries as a
result of supply responses to factor price changes.  However, little attention has been paid to
this mechanism subsequently.  It is mentioned with specific reference to skill supplies in
recent papers by Harris (1994) and Stokey (1994), but even Stokey dismisses it as
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. If allowance were made for the income gain from trade, and if the supply of skill were income-elastic, the
developing country’s skill supply might not fall absolutely, as in the diagram.  However, since this income effect
occurs also (and to an extent which there is no reason to suppose would be smaller) in the developed country, the
conclusion that trade tends to widen the gap in skill supplies between the two countries is unaffected.
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8implausible (on the grounds that enrolment in secondary and tertiary education rose rather
than fell in the more backward countries which became members of the European Union).
What are the underlying causes of the initial differences in skill supplies - the reasons for the
horizontal difference between the two supply curves in Figure 4?  Why does the developing
country start with a lower relative supply of skill than the developed country, despite a higher
relative wage for skilled labour, and thus stronger incentives to acquire skills?  What restricts
opportunities to acquire skills in response to these incentives?  These questions are
unanswerable in a timeless choice-theoretic equilibrium framework: the reasons must be
sought under headings such as "history" or "path dependency" (and, of course, include social
and political attitudes towards education and training).
Consequences for international income inequality
This paper started with a question about the effects of trade on inter-country differences, not
in skill supplies, but in per capita incomes, to which the analysis above yields no answer.  Our
H-O model, like other old trade theory, predicts that both the developed and the developing
country will gain from trade (i.e. achieve higher per capita incomes), and provides no general
reason for supposing that the high-skill country gains more than the low-skill country, or vice
versa.  Nor, according to old trade theory, does the introduction of supply elasticity alter this
conclusion: the fall in the skill supply of the developing country, like the rise in that of the
developed country, should increase its income gain from trade.
New growth theory suggests otherwise: it portrays skill (or human capital) accumulation as a
vital ingredient of income growth, not just by increasing the quantity of inputs to production,
but more fundamentally as a source of innovation and productivity improvement, involving
externalities and spill-over effects.  Skill acquisition is clearly cumulative and interactive: the
more skills people have to begin with, and the more skilled the people around them (parents,
classmates, colleagues), the better their chances of acquiring more skills.  Moreover, in the
world of work, learning-by-doing makes the use and acquisition of skills two sides of the
same coin, so that specialisation in skill-intensive activities is self-reinforcing.  It thus seems
rather likely that trade-induced divergence of skill supplies among countries would cause
long-run divergence of their per capita incomes.
This paper, though motivated by the plausibility of such a linkage between divergence of skill
supplies and of incomes, will not explore it further.  In particular, we shall not embody it in a
formal growth model, nor will we try to test it empirically (i.e. to add to the already large
econometric literature on the contribution of human capital to growth - but see Ridao-Cano
9and Wood, 1996).  Instead, the rest of this paper will be confined to testing the hypothesised
connection between increased openness to trade and divergence in skill supplies.  For unless
and until this connection, which is the distinctive element of our argument, is shown to exist
and to be quantitatively important, there seems little point in trying to build upon it a larger
story about openness and international income inequality.
Even this larger story about openness and income inequality would not be the whole story.
Whether incomes converge or diverge depends on aspects of openness other than trade (for
example, direct foreign investment), and on mechanisms other than skill accumulation,
especially transfer of technology (which H-O theory rules out by assumption).  Indeed, those
who argue that openness causes convergence define openness broadly, and stress technology
transfer - as does Quah (1996), who argues that trade may cause divergence.  These other
linkages have also been tested empirically, with mixed results (Aitken and Harrison, 1994;
Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister, 1995; Blomstrom and Kokko, 1996).  But whether they are
more or less powerful than our divergence mechanism, and in what contexts, remains to be
investigated.
2. Description of the data
In this section, before proceeding to econometric analysis of the effects of changes in
openness on skill supplies, which will use data on about 90 countries during 1960-90, we
discuss the two key variables involved - skill and openness - and examine their movement
over this period.
Measures of skill
The only measures of skill available for large country samples refer to the length of time
people spend in formal education.  We thus lack information on how much (and what) they
learned during their time in school, and on all the skills acquired in other ways - through
formal training and experience.  These gaps may not be too serious for single-period cross-
country analysis: length of schooling is strongly correlated across countries with school
quality and post-school skill acquisition (e.g. France is far above Uganda on all three
dimensions), and is thus a reasonable proxy for all aspects of skill.  They are more worrying
in analysis, such as ours, which deals with changes over time: there is no reason, for example,
to suppose that large rises in length of schooling are generally associated with big
improvements in school quality (which may fall), or in post-school skill acquisition.  Cross-
country variation in changes in length of schooling is thus likely to be a poor proxy for
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variation in the extent of the increase in skill in an economically relevant sense - but it is the
only proxy we currently have.
Two sorts of data on length of education are available: the average years of schooling of the
adult (over-15)3 population, from Barro and Lee (1996); and school enrolment rates, from the
UNESCO Yearbook.  We shall use the former as our measure of a country’s initial skill
endowment, since it refers to the whole stock of education.  As our dependent variable,
though, we shall use enrolment rates (which refer only to young people), because the
mechanism by which trade-induced changes in the relative demand for, and wages of, skilled
workers affect the supply of educated labour must be by encouraging more (or fewer) people
to enrol (or stay longer) in school.4  We shall examine separately the effects on enrolments at
different levels of education (primary, secondary and tertiary).5
To make a preliminary visual examination of the data, in relation to our hypotheses, we
divide countries into six groups, according to their initial (1960) resource endowments.  The
first split is into three groups of equal size, on the basis of average adult years of schooling,
labelled LE, ME and HE (for low, medium and high education).6  Each of these three skill
groups is then divided into two on the basis of natural resource endowments, and more
specifically according to whether land area per adult in the country concerned is above or
below the mean (in logs) for all countries, appending the labels HL and LL (for high land and
low land).  Land area is obviously not an ideal measure of natural resources, but it performs
remarkably well - absolutely, and by comparison with more complex measures - in explaining
cross-country differences in the share of primary products in exports (Wood and Berge,
1994), and thus seems adequate for the purposes of this paper.
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. Data for the over-25 population are also available from the same source.  Neither accurately measures the
education level of the labour force, which is the variable of economic interest, but, of the two, the over-15 data
are a better approximation for most countries.
4
. Eventually, changes in enrolment rates translate into changes in average adult years of schooling, but the lags
are long and variable, depending on birth and death rates.  We tried using the change in average adult years of
schooling over the whole period 1960-90, adjusted for demographic dynamics, as an alternative dependent
variable (with results available on request).  This variable is positively correlated across countries with whole-
period changes in secondary enrolment rates (R = 0.55) and in tertiary enrolment rates (R = 0.34), but is
inversely correlated with whole-period changes in primary enrolment rates (R = -0.20).
5
. In all cases, our data refer to gross enrolment rates, meaning that the numerator includes pupils at the level of
schooling concerned who are above or below the normal age range for that level (and hence not included in the
population cohort in the denominator).
6
. Inspection of Appendix 1 should arouse some concern about the quality of the years of schooling data: for
example, it is hard to believe that Zambia was a more educated country in 1960 than Portugal, or Guyana than
Austria.
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For each of the six groups, whose membership is listed in Appendix 1, we plot (unweighted)
average time series of primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment rates.  Figure 5 shows strong
convergence at the primary level.  Three country groups (HELL, HEHL, and MELL) had
already achieved almost 100% enrolment by the start of the period, and MEHL caught them
up by 1980.  Both LE groups also rapidly closed the large initial gap between them and the
HE groups, at least until 1985.  These movements were probably driven largely by
autonomous political pressure for universal basic education.
Figure 6, which refers to secondary enrolments, shows a pattern mainly of divergence.  The
gaps between the HE and ME groups increased slightly, and those between the ME and LE
groups more substantially.  Within the HE group, land-scarce countries made more progress
than land-abundant ones, at least in the latter part of the period.  Within the ME group, too,
the LL countries did better than the HL ones, except in the 1970s, when there was a primary
commodity price boom.  This difference between decades is more pronounced within the LE
group, where the LL countries made somewhat more progress than the HL ones in the 1960s
and 1980s, but the changes over the whole period are dominated by what happened in the
1970s, when enrolment growth slowed in LL countries and accelerated in HL ones.
The data on tertiary enrolments in Figure 7 also show a pattern mainly of divergence.  The
initial gaps between the three education groups widened in all cases.  Within both the middle
and lower education groups, land-scarce countries made more progress than land-abundant
countries over the period as a whole, though (as with secondary enrolments) the opposite
happened in the 1970s, especially for the ME group.  By contrast, within the HE group,
tertiary enrolments rose less over the whole period in land-scarce than in land-abundant
countries.
In summary, as between groups with different initial levels of education, divergence over time
in secondary and tertiary enrolment rates was offset by convergence in primary enrolments
(average adult years of schooling rose by roughly the same absolute amount in each education
group).  As between groups with different natural resource endowments, land-scarce
countries in most cases made more educational progress than land-abundant ones, although
the latter did better during the commodity price boom of the 1970s.
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Figure 5. Primary enrolment rates
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Figure 7. Tertiary enrolment rates
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Measures of openness
Indicators of openness fall into two broad categories: those based on trade flows, and those
based on trade barriers.7  One example of each will now be described, and its behaviour over
time in our six country groups examined.  Because these indicators vary from year to year, the
points in the figures are based on averages of several years, as specified on the horizontal axes
(e.g. 7074 is an average of the years 1970 to 1974).
The flow measure is the ratio of exports to GDP (in current PPP prices from the Penn world
tables).8  Figure 8, using this indicator, shows a general but uneven increase in openness after
the late 1960s.  The biggest and most sustained rises were in the HELL and (particularly)
MELL groups.  Openness also increased over the whole period in all three of the high land
groups, but by less, partly because two of them (HEHL and LEHL) became more closed after
the late 1970s.  The LELL group (the least open, because it contains all the large South Asian
countries) became gradually more open between the late 1960s and the early 1980s, but then
experienced a reversal.
The barrier measure is that constructed by Sachs and Warner (1995), which for each country
and year takes the value zero (closed) or one (open), on the basis of a battery of trade policy
indicators.9  Figure 9, which shows the evolution of the average scores in each of our groups,
again suggests a general rise in openness, but with considerable variation.  The HELL group,
the most open, became somewhat more so in the 1960s and 1980s.  The MELL group also
became more open (except in the late 70s), as did the LELL group (after the late 1960s).  All
three land-abundant groups markedly increased their openness during the 1980s; prior to that,
openness had risen for most of the period in the HEHL group, but the MEHL and LEHL
groups had become more closed, especially between the early 1960s and the early 1970s.
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. In our H-O model, we do not need to measure explicitly the direction of trade, which is determined by
resource endowments.  By contrast, in a model concerned with technology transfer (e.g. Quah 1996), the
direction of trade would require a fuller treatment.
8
. As is well known, this measure of openness varies inversely with country size, and is sometimes adjusted for
this (e.g. by using deviations from a cross-country regression of the export ratio against size).  We decided not to
make such an adjustment, partly because our interest is in changes over time within countries, and partly because
the higher value of this ratio in smaller countries may well correctly be capturing the fact that trade has a larger
impact on their labour markets.  Our barrier measure of openness, by contrast, is independent of country size -
but this could be viewed either as a strength or as a weakness.
9
. A country is classified as closed if it has one or more of the following characteristics: non-tariff barriers
covering 40% or more of trade; average tariff rates of 40% or more; a black market exchange rate discount of
20% or more; a socialist economic system; or a state monopoly on major exports.
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Figure 8. Ratio of exports to GDP (PPP values, current international prices)
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
6064 6569 7074 7579 8084 8592
HELL
HEHL
MELL
MEHL
LELL
LEHL
Figure 9. Barrier measure of openness to trade (OPEN)
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Both the flow measure and the barrier measure suggest that most of our six groups became
more open over the whole period, and that the increases were generally more sustained in the
land-scarce countries.  However, there are some differences between the two measures as
regards the timing of events, particularly for the land-abundant groups.  The flow measure
suggests that MEHL and LEHL became more open in the first half of the period, whereas the
barrier measure suggests they became more closed.  Moreover, at the end of the period the
flow measure suggests a decline in openness for two of the HL groups, whereas the barrier
measure shows a rise for all three, with a similar contradiction for the LELL group.
3. Econometric specification
To derive an appropriate specification for testing our hypothesis about the effects of changes
in openness on skill supplies, we return to the model in Figure 4, which involves two
equations (a demand curve and a supply curve)
w D n TO= ( , ) (1)
w S n ET= ( , ) (2)
where w is the wage of skilled workers, relative to unskilled workers, n is the number of
skilled workers, relative to the number of unskilled workers, TO is a measure of openness to
trade, which affects the slope of the demand curve, and ET (for "education and training") is a
measure of opportunities for skill acquisition, which affect the horizontal alignment of the
supply curve.  ET is intended to capture all influences on the relative supply of skilled
workers which are independent of the current level of demand, such as government policies,
history, and culture.
Estimating equations
Assuming that labour markets clear, equations (1) and (2) can be reduced to a single equation
D n TO S n ET( , ) ( , )  = (3)
from which we can derive and estimate a reduced form
n f TO ET= ( , ) (4)
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In this equation, the partial derivative with respect to ET must always be positive.  With
respect to TO, however, its sign varies, depending on the resource endowments of the country
concerned: for countries with high initial levels of skill (and/or scarce land), the sign is
positive, because greater openness to trade increases the relative demand for skilled labour;
but for countries with low initial levels of skill (and/or abundant land), it is negative, because
openness reduces the demand for skilled labour.10
To allow for this variation in sign, we interact each country’s TO with its deviations from
world average skill and land endowments, measured as
%E E Eit it t
Et
=
−
σ
  and  %L L Lit it t
Lt
=
−
σ
where E is average years of schooling, L is land area per worker (expressed in logs, because
its distribution is skewed), and i and t index countries and time periods respectively.  Et  and
Lt  are the cross-country means of E and L in each period, and σE t  and σ Lt  are the cross-
country standard deviations (to make the scales of %Eit  and %Lit  comparable).  The sign of %Eit
depends on whether the skill endowment of the country concerned is above the world average
(positive) or below it (negative), while the absolute size of %Eit  depends on how far above or
below the world average the country’s endowment lies (and similarly for %Lit ).  Our
specification is thus
ER TO E TO L ETit it it it it it it= + ∗ − ∗ + +α β β δ µ1 2( % ) ( % )  (6)
where ER, the dependent variable, is the enrolment rate (to be denoted more specifically later
by PER, SER and TER, for primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment), and µ  is the error
term.  We expect the sign of the coefficient on the first interaction term, β1, to be positive,
because greater openness should raise enrolments in countries with above-average skill
endowments (i.e. with positive values of %Eit ) and lower them in countries with below-average
endowments (negative values of %Eit ).  Conversely, the sign on the second interaction term
should be negative, because greater openness should lower enrolments in countries with
above-average land abundance.  We shall also try combining skill and land into a single
endowment measure, the skill/land ratio (E/L), making the specification
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. Sachs and Warner (1995, Table 12) have a skill accumulation regression with openness to trade as an
independent variable, but do not allow for the possibility that its sign might vary with resource endowments,
which may explain why the coefficient is small and statistically insignificant.
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ER TO E L ETit it it it it= + ∗ + +α β δ µ( ( %/ ) )  (6a)
where ( %/ )E L it  is the deviation from the world average skill/land ratio, and the sign of the
coefficient on the interaction term should be positive.
An alternative way of allowing for the expected variation in the sign on TO is to use dummy
variables to distinguish groups of countries with different resource endowments.  In the
simplest case of two such groups, and thus one dummy, D (= 1 for skill-abundant countries
and 0 for skill-scarce ones), the regression would be of the form11
ER D TO TO D ETit it it it it it it= + + + ∗ + +α γ γ γ δ µ1 2 3 ( )  (7)
The test of our hypothesis in this specification concerns the sign of the coefficient, γ 3, on the
interaction of the dummy and the openness variable: it should be positive, since greater
openness increases enrolments more in countries with initially greater skill endowments.12
The dummy specification is in some ways more attractive than the continuous specification
(equation 6).  Grouping countries in different ways allows us to explore non-linearities and
discontinuities in the effects of endowments on enrolment rates, and the effects of particular
combinations of skill and land endowments.  However, the dummy specification also has
disadvantages: it throws away information on within-group variation in endowments, and it is
subject to downward (truncated regression) bias for coefficients such as γ 3, because the basis
of the country grouping (average years of schooling) is correlated with the dependent variable
(the enrolment rate).  We shall thus focus most of our attention on the continuous
specification.
As proxies for ET, we use three variables (derived from UNESCO and World Bank data, the
Penn World Tables, and other sources already mentioned):
TSAP: the number of teachers divided by the school age population of the country
concerned (at all levels of education), a volume measure of the availability of education, and
                                                          
11
. We omit slope dummy interactions with ET, but always include intercept dummies, whose omission can
distort slope dummy interaction coefficients.
12
. The model in Figure 4 also implies that γ 2  should be negative, but this is less vital: the key point of our
hypothesis is that greater openness to trade tends to widen inter-country differences in skill supplies, and to
establish this tendency a positive value of γ 3  would be sufficient.
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of government commitment to education (since in most countries most teachers are hired by
the government);13
REEY: the ratio of recurrent public expenditure on education to GDP, a value measure
of the quantity and quality of education available, and of government commitment;
PCY: per capita (actually, per adult) real PPP GDP, which is intended to capture the
many ways in which richer countries offer their inhabitants more and better opportunities for
learning of all sorts.14
These are not ideal measures, but we could not improve on them.15  Among other problems,
TSAP and REEY are unlikely to be strictly independent of current demand for education
(which emerges in the form not only of higher enrolments but also of political pressure for
educational expansion and improvement), and so their inclusion tends to bias downwards our
estimates of the effects of openness on skill supplies.
Panel data techniques
Our data are in the form of a panel of about 90 countries and six five-year time periods (data
on enrolments and on the barrier measure of openness are not available on an annual basis).
The values of ER, TO, TSAP and REEY are averages within each five-year period (which for
ER are simply the means of the opening and closing values), while the values of the resource
endowment variables and of PCY refer to the start of each period.
Most of our estimates are based on a two-way error component model which allows for both
country-specific and time-specific fixed effects.  In such a model, each coefficient shows the
relationship between changes over time in the dependent variable (other than those common
to all countries in each period) and changes over time in the independent variable.  This
                                                          
13
. This variable differs from (the inverse of) the pupil/teacher ratio, or class size, which depends also on the
(total) enrolment rate of the school age population.  There is an accounting relationship between T/SAP and the
enrolment rate (pupils/SAP) via class size (pupils/T).  Thus if class size were fixed, it would make no sense to
use TSAP in a regression explaining the enrolment rate.  The justification for including it is that class size, within
limits, is endogenous, determined by the interaction of a given supply of teachers and the demand for school
places.
14
. PCY could be combined with REEY into one variable (REE per person), but this would imply, probably
wrongly, that inter-country income differences affect learning opportunities only via public expenditure on
education.
15
. Nor was our specification improved by adding other variables which have been used in cross-country
regressions explaining differences in schooling (e.g. political instability and output growth variability).
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approach seems the right one for our purposes, since our hypothesis is fundamentally about
movements over time - i.e. that increases or decreases in openness in particular countries raise
or lower their enrolment rates.  There may also be cross-country associations between levels
of openness, enrolment rates and endowments, but these are open to other causal
interpretations.
For estimation purposes, we transform the data by subtracting individual country means, so
eliminating the country-specific fixed effects.  However, we include time dummies, to test for
the presence of trends in enrolment rates common to all countries.  We then apply OLS to the
transformed data to obtain the "within" estimates of our coefficients.  This fixed-effects
approach yields estimates which are consistent, whether or not the country effects are
correlated with the independent variables, but if there is no such correlation (as appears to be
the case for our data, on the basis of a Hausman test), more efficient estimates are yielded by
a random-effects GLS model, which allows the cross-country dimension of the data, as well
as its time-series dimension, to play a role.  We therefore also experimented with this
approach, but (as will be shown) it did not much affect the results.
Because we are, in effect, estimating time-series regressions in levels, we must address the
possible problem of spurious correlation among data series which are not in fact cointegrated.
We tested SER and our flow measure of TO for order of integration, and found them to be I(0)
and cointegrated.16 However, in panels with few periods and many countries, such as ours,
older methods for dealing with autocorrelation in the error term are argued to be more
appropriate than the newer time-series approach (MaCurdy, 1982; Hsiao, 1995), so it was on
these older methods that we focused our efforts.
A Durbin-Watson test of "within" residuals developed by Bhargava, Franzini and
Narendranathan (1982), reveals significant positive first-order serial correlation in regressions
based on equation (6).  This might be because we are omitting some variable which affects
enrolment rates - for instance, the quality of governance, which might vary over time within
countries - or because we are somehow mis-specifying the dynamics of the model.  However,
the first-order autogressive coefficient, ρ, is significantly less than unity, indicating that the
residuals do not contain a unit root (and thus that first-differencing the data would not be the
                                                          
16
. The tests, using the methods in Levin and Lin (1993), used annual data for 30 years, which involved
interpolating secondary enrolment rates within five-year periods (an approach used also by Coe, Helpman and
Hoffmaister, 1995, but which raises doubts about the validity of the test).  We tested for cointegration between
the residuals of a regression of SER on PCY (as a proxy for ET) and our flow measure of TO (the ratio of exports
to GDP).
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right response).  We corrected for the autocorrelation by applying a maximum likelihood
iterative method for panel data to the ρ-differenced series (Baltagi, 1995).17
Two other aspects of our estimation techniques deserve mention.  One is our experiments
with instrumental variables to correct for measurement errors in our resource variables: we
failed to find an adequate instrument for our natural resource variable (land area per adult),
and were thus unable to apply this method to regressions based on equation (6); but we were
able to apply it to equation (6a), by using the ratio of manufactured to primary exports as an
instrument for E/L.  The other is that our regressions based on the dummy specification
(equation 7) were fitted by minimising the sum of absolute deviations (MAD) rather than of
squared deviations (as in OLS).  We did this to reduce the influence of outliers, which have
more influence in the dummy specification (since it divides the sample into small groups),
although we also tried applying MAD to the continuous specification.
4. Results
Table 1 presents the results of six regressions based on the continuous specification (equation
6) - two for each of our three dependent variables, the enrolment rates in primary, secondary
and tertiary education (PER, SER, and TER), of which one uses the flow measure of openness
to trade (XY) and the other the barrier measure (OPEN).  All these regressions are estimated
by OLS (on within-transformed data).  The means, standard deviations, and units of the
variables are given in Table 2.
Looking first at the secondary enrolment results in columns 1 and 2, the coefficients on the
time dummies (t2 to t6) show a global upward trend of about 4 percentage points per five-
year period.  The coefficients on the ET measures (TSAP, REEY and PCY) all have the
expected positive signs, and are statistically significant, which indicates that the upward trend
was faster in countries whose governments made greater efforts to expand education and
where incomes rose more.  The coefficients on the interactions between both openness
variables and the skill-deviation variable are also positive and statistically significant, in
accordance with our hypothesis: the effect of more trade on secondary enrolment rates was
more favourable, the higher the initial education level of the country concerned.  (The smaller
size of the coefficient with the barrier measure of openness than with the flow measure
reflects the different scales of these two measures.)18
                                                          
17
. This method requires the errors to be homoscedastic.  White’s general test, which is robust to non-normality
of the error distribution, revealed no significant (at the 10% level) heteroscedasticity in our data.
18
. This difference is not apparent from the summary statistics in Table 2: however, the policy changes required
to alter the OPEN measure from 0 to 1 (see note 9) would usually cause much less change in the ratio of exports
to GDP (for example, a rise of 0.2).
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Table 1. Regression results: continuous specification
Dep.var. = SER TER PER
TO = XY OPEN XY OPEN XY OPEN
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
t2 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.005 0.03 0.04
(4.0) (3.3) (1.2) (0.8) (2.8) (3.1)
t3 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.07
(7.7) (6.6) (3.7) (3.1) (5.0) (5.6)
t4 0.12 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.10 0.11
(10.8) (9.7) (5.7) (5.0) (7.3) (8.1)
t5 0.16 0.15 0.05 0.04 0.13 0.14
(12.3) (11.1) (6.5) (5.7) (8.0) (8.9)
t6 0.20 0.19 0.06 0.06 0.15 0.16
(13.6) (12.8) (7.4) (6.8) (8.6) (9.3)
TO* %E 0.17 0.04 0.08 0.01 -0.07 -0.01
(4.5) (2.6) (3.3) (1.3) (-2.5) (-1.0)
TO* %L 0.01 -0.03 0.04 0.001 0.05 -0.05
(0.6) (-2.1) (2.9) (0.1) (2.2) (-3.4)
TSAP 1.65 2.02 2.45 2.43 -2.68 -2.36
(3.2) (3.6) (8.2) (8.1) (-6.5) (-5.4)
REEY 0.78 0.74 -0.07 0.09 1.07 1.16
(1.9) (1.7) (-0.4) (0.4) (2.6) (2.7)
PCY 0.10 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.02 -0.03
(6.7) (6.2) (2.5) (3.3) (0.8) (-1.7)
R 2 0.79 0.78 0.67 0.67 0.38 0.36
No. obs. 522 486 522 486 522 486
Notes: SER, TER and PER refer to secondary, tertiary and primary school enrolment rates respectively.  The
numbers is parentheses are t-ratios (based on White’s heterocedasticity-consistent S.E’s).  The method of
estimation is OLS on the within-transformed data.  See table 2 for definition of variables, and text for further
details.
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Table 2. Description of regression variables
mean std.dev     units
SER 0.44 0.29     ratio
TER 0.11 0.11     ratio
PER 0.87 0.20     ratio
%E 0 1     standard deviations of E
%L 0 1     standard deviations of L
E / L% 0 1     standard deviations of E/L
E 4.47 2.66     years
L 3.74 1.63     loge (sq km per thousand adults)
E/L 4.44 2.00     loge (thousand school-years per sq km)
XY 0.30 0.21     ratio
OPEN 0.44 0.48     1=open, 0=closed
TSAP 0.03 0.02     ratio
REEY 0.03 0.01     ratio
PCY 8.33 0.86     loge (real PPP GDP per adult)
Notes: %E , %L  and E / L%  are transformations of E, L and E/L respectively, each being the deviation from the
cross-country mean in each period, divided by the standard deviation in each period.  OPEN is calculated for
each country as the average of 1s (open) and 0s (closed) for each five-year period.  All the variables are defined
as averages over each five year period, except for E, L, E/L and PCY, which are the values at the start of each
period.
Table 3. Secondary enrolment rates: alternative estimation techniques
Random GLS MAD MLAR1
TO = XY OPEN XY OPEN XY OPEN
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TO* %E 0.23 0.06 0.20 0.06 0.08 0.03
(7.5) (4.9) (7.2) (6.1) (3.0) (3.0)
TO* %L 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01
(0.8) (-2.8) (-0.4) (-2.3) (-0.6) (-1.0)
TSAP 2.51 3.03 1.60 2.29 2.43 2.51
(5.4) (6.3) (4.8) (6.5) (4.8) (4.9)
REEY 0.81 0.80 0.56 0.76 0.68 0.69
(2.3) (2.1) (2.1) (2.7) (2.2) (2.1)
PCY 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.08
(10.4) (9.8) (8.8) (8.8) (4.8) (4.7)
R 2 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.70 0.70
No. obs. 522 486 522 486 522 486
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are t-ratios.  All regressions include time dummies.  The random GLS
regressions include a constant term not reported in this table.  MLAR1 refers to maximum likelihood iterative
estimation of the ρ-differenced data.  The estimates of ρ for (5) and (6) are 0.62 (s.e. = 0.04) and 0.64 (s.e. =
0.04) respectively.  See Table 2 for definition of variables, and text for further details.
24
The interaction of OPEN with the land-deviation variable again has the sign predicted by our
hypothesis: negative (and significant), which implies that lowering barriers to trade tended to
reduce secondary enrolment rates in land-abundant countries, compared to land-scarce ones.
However, using the flow measure of openness (XY), the land-deviation interaction is positive
(albeit insignificant).  This difference in the coefficients reflects the contradictions between
the time paths of the two measures of openness in land-abundant developing countries shown
earlier in Figures 8 and 9.
The results for tertiary enrolments in columns (3) and (4) of Table 1 are similar in most
respects to those for secondary enrolments, with a global upward trend (of about 1 percentage
point per period), and positive and statistically significant coefficients on two of the three ET
proxies.  The interactions between both measures of openness and the skill-deviation variable
are positive, as expected, though only the coefficient based on XY is statistically significant.
However, the coefficients on the interaction between openness and the land-deviation
variable are both positive, counter to our hypothesis, significantly so for the one based on the
flow measure (XY).  This outcome reflects the large rise in tertiary enrolments in land-
abundant HE countries shown earlier in Figure 7, which may have arisen from autonomous
pressures for which our ET measures do not adequately control.
The results for primary enrolments in columns (5) and (6) are fundamentally different from
those for secondary and tertiary enrolments.  In particular, the interactions between both
measures of openness and the skill-deviation variable are negative, one of them significantly
so.  The interactions with the land-deviation variable have different signs, depending on the
measure of openness (as with secondary enrolments, but unlike tertiary enrolments, where
both measures yielded the wrong sign).  Primary enrolments, as at the other two levels, show
an upward trend, but with odd coefficients on the ET proxies, particularly PCY and TSAP (the
primary regressions also fit much less well).  These differences reflect those shown in Figures
5-7: general convergence of primary enrolment rates, contrasting with general divergence at
the secondary and tertiary levels.
Use of the alternative specification based on deviations of the skill/land ratio (equation 6a),
rather than of skill and land endowments separately, does not change the outcome for any
level of education (Appendix 2a).  The coefficients on the time dummies and the ET proxies
are almost identical in all cases.  For secondary enrolments, both coefficients on the
interaction of openness with skill/land ratio deviations are, as expected, positive and
significant.  For tertiary enrolments, both are close to zero (because of the conflict of signs
between skill and land deviations taken separately).  For primary enrolments, the interaction
with XY has the wrong sign (because the signs using skill and land deviations separately are
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both wrong), while that with OPEN has the right sign only because (in column 6 of Table 1)
the rightly-signed land deviation outweighs the wrongly-signed skill deviation.
Alternative estimation techniques
Table 3 presents the results of secondary enrolment regressions using three different
estimation techniques mentioned earlier.  The use of random GLS does not much alter the
results, though it makes most of the coefficients, including that on the interaction of openness
with the skill-deviation variable, larger and statistically more significant.  Fitting on the basis
of minimum absolute deviations also makes the skill interaction coefficient larger, and, unlike
OLS, produces a correctly signed (but insignificant) coefficient on the interaction between XY
and the land deviation variable.  Maximum-likelihood estimation with autocorrelation-
correction (MLAR1), too, produces the expected signs on the interactions of both openness
variables with land deviations, but neither is significant (as had been the case with OPEN
using the other techniques).  The coefficients on the interaction of the openness measures
with skill deviations become smaller (that based on the XY measure halves), but both remain
statistically significant.19
Using these alternative techniques with the skill/land ratio specification  and secondary
enrolments has similar effects (Appendix 2b).  Random GLS and MAD yield somewhat
larger coefficients on the interaction between openness and skill/land ratio deviations, and
MLAR1 somewhat smaller coefficients.  However, the use of an instrumental variable (the
ratio of manufactured to primary exports) for the skill/land ratio more than doubles the size of
the interaction coefficient, with both measures of openness.
For tertiary enrolment rates, the use of random GLS and MAD again make the - expected
positive - interactions between openness and skill deviations more significant, especially for
the OPEN measure, while correcting for autocorrelation makes them smaller and less
significant (Appendix 3a).  The interactions between openness and land deviations, which are
wrongly signed with OLS (though significantly so only for XY) remain wrongly signed and/or
insignificant with the other estimation techniques.  For primary enrolments (Appendix 3b),
likewise, all three alternative estimation techniques leave us with consistently wrong signs
                                                          
19
. We also estimated the regressions by OLS with first-differenced data (though this is inappropriate, because ρ
is significantly less than unity).  The coefficients on the interaction of the openness variables with skill
deviations were smaller than in columns 5 and 6 of Table 3, but still just significant, while the interactions with
land deviations remained much the same.  Using an alternative method of first-differencing the interaction terms
(differencing only the openness component, rather than its product with the resource deviation), the size and
significance of the coefficients on the interactions with skill were further reduced (and that based on XY became
insignificant), but the interactions with land were almost unaffected.
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(some significantly so) on the interaction between openness and skill deviations, and the
variation in the sign of the interaction between openness and land deviations, depending on
the measure of openness used, is consistent across all estimation methods.
Dummy variable specification
Table 4 presents the results of regressions for secondary enrolments using the alternative
dummy variable specification (equation 7), estimated by MAD for reasons noted earlier.
Each of the regressions uses a different set of dummy variables - i.e. six alternative ways of
grouping countries according to their skill and land endowments.20  The main objective is to
investigate the effects of particular combinations of skill and land (beyond the simple
skill/land ratio used in the continuous specification).  In other respects, these results resemble
those of the continuous specification - with similar coefficients on the ET proxies and the
time dummies (not shown).  However, only the flow measure of openness (XY) is used in
these regressions: this is because the infrequency of changes in the barrier measure (OPEN)
causes the results for some groups to be driven by just one or two countries.
In all six regressions, the coefficient on XY, which measures the effect of greater openness on
secondary enrolments in the control group, is negative (and statistically significant).  Since
the dummy variables are defined in such a way that the control group is always the one with
least skill and/or most land, this result is clearly consistent with our hypothesis.  However, the
main focus of our hypothesis is not on the absolute effects of openness in unfavourably
endowed countries, but on how openness affects the gaps in skill supplies between them and
more favourably endowed countries.  These differential effects are measured by the
coefficients on the interactions between XY and the dummy variables (defined in such a way
that the effects are incremental, reading down each column).21
The first two regressions divide countries into two skill groups, according to whether their
average years of schooling are above or below the global mean, labelled HME (for high and
higher-middle education) and LME (for low and lower-middle education).  In regression 1,
the interaction between XY and HME is positive and statistically significant, confirming that
greater openness tended to widen the gap in secondary enrolment rates between more and less
                                                          
20
. Resource endowments are measured at the start of each five-year period, and thus particular countries can
move between endowment groups over time.  The numerical criteria for allocating countries to groups (e.g.
average land area per worker) are also recalculated each period.  Appendix 1 shows the movement of countries
among endowment groups between 1960 and 1990.
21
. Intercept dummies corresponding with the slope (XY) interaction dummies were included in all regressions.
The values of their coefficients are not shown in the table, but were in almost all cases very small.
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Table 4. Secondary enrolment rates: dummy specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
XY -0.09 -0.10 -0.19 -0.20 -0.17 -0.22
(-2.5) (-2.4) (-3.1) (-4.1) (-3.8) (-4.5)
XY*LMELL 0.14
(1.6)
XY*HME 0.26 0.14
(4.9) (1.3)
XY*LL -0.03
(-0.5)
XY*LELL 0.16 0.19
(1.2) (1.5)
XY*ME 0.27 0.18 0.34 0.21
(3.8) (1.3) (5.3) (1.5)
XY*MELL -0.11 -0.15
(-1.6) (-2.1)
XY*HE 0.20 0.12 0.19 0.22
(3.0) (1.9) (2.7) (3.1)
TSAP 2.10 2.09 2.06 2.16 2.14 2.15
(6.1) (6.1) (6.0) (6.3) (6.3) (6.3)
REEY 0.57 0.54 0.11 0.21 0.29 0.29
(2.1) (2.0) (0.4) (0.8) (1.1) (1.1)
PCY 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
(7.9) (8.1) (8.7) (8.2) (8.5) (8.1)
R 2 0.78 0.77 0.78 0.77 0.77 0.77
Notes: t-ratios are in parentheses.  The definitions of the dummy variables with which XY is interacted are as
follows.  HME is 1 for HME countries, 0 otherwise.  LMELL is 1 for HME and LMELL countries, 0 otherwise.
LL is 1 for LL countries, 0 otherwise.  ME is 1 for HE and ME countries, 0 otherwise.  HE is 1 for HE countries,
0 otherwise.  LELL is 1 for HE, ME and LELL countries, 0 otherwise.  MELL is 1 for HE and MELL countries,
0 otherwise.  The method of estimation is MAD (minimum absolute deviations) on the within-transformed data.
All regressions include time dummies and resource-dummy intercepts.  The number of observations is 522.  See
Table 2 for definition of variables, and text for further details.
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educated countries.  In regression 2, the LME group is sub-divided between countries with
land area per adult above the global mean (in logs), who are the control group, and those with
below-average land (identified by the dummy LMELL).  The interactions of XY with both
dummies are positive (albeit not significant): among poorly-educated countries, greater
openness has a more favourable effect on enrolments where land is scarce, but not such a
favourable effect as in better-educated countries.
Regressions 3-6 are all based on a division of countries into three skill groups (labelled HE,
ME and LE), combined in various ways with the division between land-abundant (HL) and
land-scarce (LL) countries.  In regression 3, the skill and land divisions are independent of
each other: the positive and significant interactions between XY and both ME and HE
reconfirm that greater openness has a more favourable effect on secondary enrolments, the
more educated the country; but the insignificantly negative interaction of XY with LL shows
that, across countries at all skill levels, land scarcity does not have the predicted favourable
effect on enrolments (just as with the continuous specification using XY).  When the two
lowest skill groups are subdivided between HL and LL countries, as in regressions 4-6,
allowing the effects of skill and land to be interdependent, land scarcity does have a
favourable effect within the LE group (as it did in the LME group), but it has the opposite
effect within the ME group - enrolments benefited more from greater openness in land-
abundant than in land-scarce ME countries.
We applied the dummy specification also to enrolments at other levels (Appendix 4).  For
tertiary enrolments, as with secondary enrolments, the coefficients on XY are negative in all
cases, and the interactions between XY and HME, ME and HE are positive in all cases,
confirming that openness had a more favourable effect in countries which were initially more
highly educated.  The interactions between XY and land scarcity within the skill groups,
however, are all wrongly (negatively) signed, again confirming the results with the continuous
specification.  For primary enrolments, too, the dummy specification, like the continuous
specification, yields wrongly signed coefficients on almost all the openness and interaction
variables.
To summarise, the results for secondary and tertiary education are broadly consistent with our
hypothesis.  With all specifications, greater openness has had more favourable effects on
enrolment rates in more-educated than in less-educated countries, thus tending to widen the
gap in skill endowments between them.  Indeed, greater openness seems to have lowered the
absolute level of enrolments in less-educated countries.  The effects of differences in land
endowments vary with the specification, the measure of openness, and the level of education:
land scarcity causes greater openness to have a favourable effect on secondary enrolments,
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particularly in poorly-educated countries, but if anything the opposite effect on tertiary
enrolments.  The results for primary education are almost entirely inconsistent with our
hypothesis, but could plausibly be reconciled with it by arguing that enrolment changes at this
level have been driven by autonomous variations in political will and capacity for which we
are unable to control.
6. Conclusions
The hypothesis of this paper, derived from a skill-based Heckscher-Ohlin model with elastic
supply, is that greater openness to trade tends to widen initial inter-country differences in skill
endowments.  This hypothesis is of practical interest because new growth theory (and
evidence) suggest that such a widening of skill endowments would cause long-term growth
rates of per capita income to diverge.  In this way, greater openness might increase
international income inequality, contrary to what is now widely believed.
Our statistical analysis gives some support to this hypothesis, except for primary education,
where the marked catching-up of enrolment rates that has occurred in poor countries over the
past three decades appears to have had little or nothing to do with trade.  For secondary and
tertiary education, however, the results of our regressions suggest that greater openness does
tend to increase differences in enrolment rates between more-educated and less-educated
countries (especially land-abundant less-educated countries, such as those in sub-Saharan
Africa).  Moreover, these econometric results seem consistent with global changes over the
past three decades: the world has become more open to trade, and gaps in secondary and
tertiary enrolment rates have widened.
It is important to consider the magnitude of the divergent effects implied by our regressions,
since even statistically significant coefficients might still be trivially small.  Rough
calculations (in Appendix 5a) based on the three-dummy variable specification suggest that a
world-wide increase of 20 percentage points in export/GDP ratios (which would be a large
rise in this measure of openness) would widen the gap in secondary enrolment rates between
low-education and high-education countries by 9 percentage points, and in tertiary enrolment
rates by 11 percentage points.  Together, these enrolment changes would eventually widen the
gap in average adult years of schooling between the LE and HE groups by about one year of
secondary and tertiary education.22  Calculations based on the continuous specification (in
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. Primary education is omitted from this summary, on the grounds that the estimated coefficients are
misleading, but is included in the calculation in Appendix 5a.  The effects of differing land endowments are also
omitted.
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Appendix 5b) suggest a widening of between a quarter and a half of one year of secondary
and tertiary schooling.
Are these big changes?  The figures for the widening of the enrolment rate gaps seem
substantial when compared to "world" average enrolment rates of 44 percent for secondary
education and 11 percent for tertiary education, and for the change of one year in average
years of schooling in comparison to the "world" mean of 4.5 years (Table 2).  The key issue,
however, is how much difference such a widening would make to growth rates (and hence
divergence) of per capita incomes: this question is beyond the scope of our paper, but we can
hazard an answer to it on the basis of existing research.  In a Barro-type regression explaining
growth of per capita GDP during 1960-85, the coefficient on 1960 average years of schooling
is 0.005 (Berge et al, 1994, Table A1).23  This implies that the one-year widening of the gap
in average years of schooling between HE and LE countries would cause their growth rates of
per capita income to diverge by half a percentage point per year - which is not trivially small
when compounded over long periods.
Of course, these numbers should not be taken too seriously.  The regression results on which
they are based are subject to at least the usual number of doubts and qualifications, and the
magnitude calculations are in the back-of-an-envelope class, not proper simulations.  That
does not mean, however, that these numbers necessarily overstate the divergent effects of
greater openness on skill supplies: on the contrary, they may understate them, for two reasons.
One is their omission of primary education, where there could be an effect similar to that on
secondary and tertiary education, though we have been unable to measure it: the association
in sub-Saharan Africa over the past decade between rising openness and falling primary
enrolments may not be just a coincidence.  The other is their neglect of all the skills acquired
outside formal education, on which we lack systematic data.  There is thus much scope for
further research: on the skill supply mechanism, on its linkage to growth rates, and on other
connections between openness and growth from which we have abstracted, such as
technology transfer.
It is even more of a leap to consider possible implications for policy, but let us suppose for
the sake of argument that our hypothesis is correct, and ask how governments ought to
respond.  The main message is that free trade may not be the developmentally best policy for
backward countries, since it retards their accumulation of skills by causing them to specialise
in goods of low skill intensity.  To some extent, this retardation can be offset by other
measures to increase the stock of skills, but people and firms will not invest in education and
                                                          
23
. The regression in question is identical to that in Barro (1991, Table 1, column 1), except that the 1960
primary and secondary enrolment rates are replaced by 1960 over-25 average years of schooling.
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training unless there is a financial return: government supply-side efforts at expansion would
therefore be uneconomic or even ineffective in a country whose pattern of trade was such that
there was little demand for skilled labour.  It is futile to build more schools if parents see no
economic advantage to enroling their children, or more training facilities if firms require few
skilled workers.
What sorts of interference with free trade might be optimal from this point of view?  No
single specific policy could be right for all poor countries.  The general criterion is "whatever
interferences are most likely to promote skill accumulation in the long run", but the details
will vary from country to country, depending on its starting point - its initial stock of skills -
and on its likely economic destination, given such unchangeable features as its natural
resources and location.  The experience of the successful East Asian developing countries
provides some general lessons: their combination of rapid educational expansion and
temporary protection of a sequence of industries of increasing skill intensity, followed by
strong incentives for these industries to export, was effective in expanding the stock of skills
because it caused the demand for educated labour to rise in line with its supply and gave
educated young people opportunities for employment in which they could add vital practical
training and experience.  However, East Asia had a good educational base, and few natural
resources: for countries where half the population is still illiterate, or natural resources are
abundant, different sets of specific trade policies would be more appropriate.
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Appendix 1. Countries grouped by 1960 levels of education (over-15 average years of
schooling) and land area per (over-15) adult
High education
Low land
Barbados
Belgium
Cyprus
Denmark
France (MELL)
Germany, West
Greece
Hong Kong
Ireland
Israel
Italy (MELL)
Japan
Netherlands
Switzerland
Trinidad & Tobago
United Kingdom
High land
Argentina
Australia
Bolivia (MEHL)
Canada
Chile (MEHL)
Fiji
Finland
Guyana (MEHL)
Iceland
New Zealand
Norway
Panama (MEHL)
Sweden
United States
Uruguay
Medium education
  Low land
*Austria (HELL)
  Dominican Rep.
  El Salvador (LELL)
  Jamaica
*Korea (HELL)
  Mauritius
*Philippines (HELL)
*Singapore
*Spain
*Sri Lanka
*Taiwan (HELL)
*Thailand
*Yugoslavia (HELL)
  High land
  Brazil (LEHL)
  Colombia
*Costa Rica (MELL)
  Ecuador
  Jordan
  Lesotho (LEHL)
  Malaysia
  Mexico
  Nicaragua (LEHL)
  Paraguay
  Peru
*South Africa
  Swaziland
  Tanzania (LEHL)
  Venezuela
  Zambia
Low education
Low land
Bangladesh
Guatemala
Haiti
India (MELL)
Indonesia (MELL)
Myanmar (Burma)
Pakistan
Portugal (MELL)
Sierra Leone (LEHL)
Turkey
High land
Algeria
Botswana
Cameroon
Central African Rep.
Ghana
Honduras (MEHL)
Iran
Kenya
Malawi (LELL)
Mali
Mozambique
Niger
Papua New Guinea
Senegal
Syria (MEHL)
Togo
Tunisia
Uganda (LELL)
Zaire
Zimbabwe
Notes: The medium education countries marked with an asterisk are in the HME group (with the high education
countries), while unmarked medium education countries are in the LME group (with the low education
countries).  In cases where a country’s group membership changed between 1960 and 1990, its 1990 group is
indicated in parentheses after its name.
Appendix 2a. Continuous specification (using the skill/land ratio)
Dep.var. = SER TER PER
TO = XY OPEN XY OPEN XY OPEN
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TO*E / L% 0.06 0.05 -0.01 -0.005 -0.05 0.04
(2.9) (2.9) (-1.1) (-0.4) (-2.4) (2.5)
TSAP 2.09 2.10 2.66 2.41 -2.86 -2.36
(3.9) (3.8) (8.6) (7.9) (-6.7) (-5.3)
REEY 0.91 0.87 -0.01 0.12 1.05 1.06
(2.2) (2.1) (-0.07) (0.6) (2.6) (2.5)
PCY 0.10 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.01 -0.03
(6.3) (6.2) (2.4) (3.5) (0.7) (-1.8)
R 2 0.78 0.78 0.66 0.67 0.37 0.36
No. obs. 522 486 522 486 522 486
Notes: SER, TER and PER refer to secondary, tertiary and primary school enrolment rates respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t-ratios (based on White’s heterocedasticity-consistent S.E’s).  All
regressions include time dummies.  The method of estimation is OLS on the within-transformed data.  See
Table 2 for definition of variables, and text for further details.
Appendix 2b. Secondary enrolment rates (using the skill/land ratio):
alternative estimation techniques
Random GLS MAD IV MLAR1
TO = XY OPEN XY OPEN XY OPEN XY OPEN
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TO*E / L% 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.14 0.13 0.05 0.03
(3.3) (4.2) (5.1) (5.0) (2.4) (3.2) (2.1) (2.0)
TSAP 3.27 3.15 2.66 2.68 2.01 2.42 2.61 2.57
(7.0) (6.5) (7.9) (7.6) (3.7) (4.2) (5.1) (5.0)
REEY 1.03 1.04 0.53 0.80 1.01 1.06 0.72 0.73
(2.8) (2.7) (2.0) (2.8) (2.4) (2.5) (2.4) (2.3)
PCY 0.15 0.15 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.08
(11.1) (10.4) (8.3) (8.1) (4.2) (4.8) (4.6) (4.7)
R 2 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.70 0.69
No. obs. 522 486 522 486 522 486 522 486
Notes: See notes to Table 3.  IV refers to instrumental variable technique, with the ratio of manufactured
exports to primary exports as the instrument for E/L.  The estimates of ρ for (7) and (8) are 0.63 (s.e. =
0.04) and 0.64 (s.e. = 0.04) respectively.  See Table 2 for definition of variables, and text for further details.
Appendix 3a. Tertiary enrolment rates: alternative estimation techniques
Random GLS MAD MLAR1
TO = XY OPEN XY OPEN XY OPEN
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TO* %E 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.005
(4.1) (3.1) (5.3) (3.4) (1.8) (1.0)
TO* %L 0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.006 0.01 0.006
(2.9) (2.0) (3.6) (-0.9) (0.1) (0.8)
TSAP 2.27 2.22 3.23 3.27 2.38 2.29
(8.6) (8.5) (17.9) (17.4) (8.7) (8.2)
REEY -0.03 0.02 -0.09 -0.07 -0.007 0.06
(-0.1) (0.1) (-0.6) (-0.4) (-0.04) (0.4)
PCY 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04
(4.7) (5.8) (3.2) (4.6) (3.3) (4.1)
R 2 0.65 0.70 0.66 0.65 0.56 0.57
No. obs. 522 486 522 486 522 486
Appendix 3b. Primary enrolment rates: alternative estimation techniques
Random GLS MAD MLAR1
TO = XY OPEN XY OPEN XY OPEN
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TO* %E -0.004 -0.004 -0.10 -0.01 -0.06 -0.009
(-0.1) (-0.3) (-3.7) (-1.2) (-1.9) (-0.8)
TO* %L 0.02 -0.04 0.03 -0.03 0.04 -0.02
(0.9) (-2.7) (1.7) (-2.8) (1.5) (-1.7)
TSAP -1.77 -1.45 -2.20 -2.26 -2.36 -2.21
(-3.4) (-2.8) (-6.7) (-6.7) (-4.4) (-4.1)
REEY 1.02 1.10 0.93 0.71 0.65 0.63
(2.6) (2.7) (3.6) (2.6) (2.1) (1.9)
PCY 0.08 0.06 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.01
(5.6) (3.9) (0.9) (-1.7) (0.9) (-0.6)
R 2 0.40 0.43 0.37 0.35 0.28 0.26
No. obs. 522 486 522 486 522 486
Notes: See notes to Table 3.  The estimates of ρ in (5) and (6) for tertiary enrolments are 0.72 (s.e. = 0.03)
and 0.73 (s.e. = 0.03) respectively, and for primary enrolments 0.64 (s.e. = 0.04) and 0.62 (s.e. = 0.04).  See
Table 2 for definition of variables, and text for further details.
Appendix 4. Dummy specification: tertiary and primary enrolments
Dep.var. = TER PER
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
XY -0.06 -0.13 -0.13 0.11 0.25 0.38
(-3.0) (-4.1) (-5.1) (2.9) (4.3) (8.2)
XY*LMELL -0.14 -0.21
(-3.0) (-2.5)
XY*HME 0.29 -0.11
(5.4) (-1.1)
XY*LL -0.24 0.07
(-7.7) (1.2)
XY*LELL -0.12 -0.34
(-1.8) (-2.7)
XY*ME 0.24 0.33 -0.42 -0.13
(6.7) (4.4) (-6.2) (-1.0)
XY*MELL -0.18 -0.007
(-5.0) (-0.1)
XY*HE 0.29 0.28 -0.23 -0.18
(8.8) (7.6) (-3.7) (-2.8)
TSAP 3.16 2.71 2.68 -1.83 -1.87 -1.77
(6.1) (15.5) (15.2) (-5.6) (-5.8) (-5.5)
REEY -0.14 -0.17 -0.19 0.67 1.09 0.90
(-1.0) (-1.3) (-1.3) (2.6) (4.3) (3.6)
PCY 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02
(3.0) (3.9) (4.0) (1.3) (2.1) (1.8)
R 2 0.65 0.68 0.67 0.38 0.40 0.38
Notes: t-ratios are in parentheses.  HME is 1 for HME countries, 0 otherwise.  LMELL is 1 for HME and
LMELL countries, 0 otherwise.  LL is 1 for LL countries, 0 otherwise.  ME is 1 for HE and ME countries, 0
otherwise.  HE is 1 for HE countries, 0 otherwise.  LELL is 1 for HE, ME and LELL countries, 0 otherwise.
MELL is 1 for HE and MELL countries, 0 otherwise.  The method of estimation is MAD (minimum
absolute deviations) on the within-transformed data.  All regressions include time dummies and resource-
dummy intercepts.  The number of observations is 522.  See Table 2 for definition of variables, and text for
further details.
Appendix 5a. Magnitude of divergence of enrolment rates caused by increased openness
Primary Secondary Tertiary
A. Estimated coefficients on interaction of ME -0.42 0.27 0.24
education dummy variables with openness
(measured by the ratio of exports to GDP, HE -0.23 0.20 0.29
or XY).  The control group is LE.  (From
Table 4, col 3, and App 4, cols 2 and 5) ME+HE -0.65 0.47 0.53
B. Divergence between LE and HE caused by a -0.13 0.09 0.11
0.2 (i.e. 20 percentage point) increase in
XY (ME + HE coefficients x 0.2)
C1. Mean value of variable (Table 2) 0.87 0.44 0.11
C2. Divergence as percentage of mean value -15 21 96
(row B divided by row C1 x 100)
D1. Duration of each level of schooling (years) 6 6 4
D2. Divergence of steady-state years of schooling -0.78 0.56 0.42
(row B x row D1): see note below
   Secondary plus tertiary 0.99
   Sum of all three levels 0.21
Notes: This table, the first of two containing the illustrative calculations referred to in section 5 of the paper,
is based on the dummy variables which divide countries into low, middle and high education groups (LE,
ME, HE), and on the flow (XY) measure of openness.  In a demographic steady state, the average length of
schooling of the adult population (e.g. 5.6 years) is simply the maximum duration of schooling (e.g. 16
years), multiplied by the average enrolment rate at all levels of schooling (e.g. 0.40).  Similarly for each
level of schooling separately: for example, for secondary schooling, with maximum duration of six years, a
rise from zero to 100% enrolment would add 6 years to average adult years of schooling.  Hence, in the
present calculation, a difference of 0.094 (i.e. 9.4 percentage points) in the secondary enrolment rate would
result in a steady-state difference of 0.094*6 (= 0.56) average adult years of schooling.
Appendix 5b. Magnitude of divergence of enrolment rates caused by increased openness
OLS on within-transformed data
         ML on ρ-differenced data
(from Table 1, cols 1-4)      (from Table 3, cols 5-6, and App 3a)
XY OPEN XY OPEN
SER  TER SER TER SER TER SER TER
A. Estimated coefficients on TO* %E 0.17 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.005
B. Divergent effect of greater openness, assuming 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.01
(a) increases of 0.2 in XY and of 1 in OPEN
(b) a 2-standard-deviation difference in skill
    endowments (i.e. %E  = 2): see note below
C1. Mean value of variable (Table 2) 0.44 0.11 0.44 0.11 0.44 0.11 0.44 0.11
C2. Divergence as percentage of mean value 15 29 18 18 7 11 14 9
(row B divided by row C1 x 100)
D1. Duration of each level of schooling (years) 6 4 6 4 6 4 6 4
D2. Divergence of steady-state years of schooling 0.41 0.13 0.48 0.08 0.19 0.05 0.36 0.04
(row B x row D1)
     Secondary plus tertiary 0.54 0.56 0.24 0.40
Notes: This table, the second of the two containing the illustrative calculations referred to in section 5 of the
paper, is based on the continuous specification, using two different measures of openness and two different
estimation techniques.  The 2-standard deviation difference used in row B shows how much the assumed
increase in openness would widen the gap in enrolment rates between a country one standard deviation
above the world average level of skill endowments and a country one standard deviation below the average.
With a normal distribution of skill endowments, this would correspond to the difference between the 16th
and the 84th percentiles, approximately in the middle of the HE and LE groups, the difference between
which provides the basis for the calculations in Appendix 5a (which are thus roughly comparable).
